Cube-Type Algebraic Attacks on Wireless Encryption Protocols S hort-range (Bluetooth) and, to some extent, mediumra nge ( Wi-Fi) wireless networks are ubiquitous, being used in homes, hospitals, assembly lines, aircraft, and even wearable computers. Several types of attacks have been successful at defeating the cryptosystems used by IEEE 802.11 and 802.16 technologies, leading us to ask how much trust we should place in wireless encryption protocols.
In Techniques, LNCS 5479, Springer, 2009, pp. 278-299) , a type of algebraic attack in which the active assault on a cryptosystem requires the attacker to extract useful information from the bit stream. By skillfully choosing some publicly settable bits, the attacker can replace the degree of the polynomial that represents the encryption function with a system of linear equations. Dinur and Shamir used this approach on the Trivium cipher and recovered the encryption key in 2 19 -bit operations. The best attempt reported in the literature used initialization vector statistical analysis, and succeeded in key recovery with a complexity of 2 55 -bit operations (S. Fischer, S. Khazaei, and W. Meier, "Reduced Complexity Attacks on the Alternating Step Generator," Proc. Selected Areas in Cryptography, LNCS 4876, Springer, 2007, pp. 1-16) .
BLUETOOTH AND PREVIOUS ATTACKS
Bluetooth, a well-established standard (IEEE 802.15 .1) for wirele s s c om mu n ic a t ion b et we en different devices-such as personal computers, laptops, and mobile phones-operates over a short range and at low power. For efficiency-in speed, size, and power consumption-the system uses the E0 (128-bit) stream cipher instead of one of the widely used block ciphers. 
CUBE ATTACK
The cube attack is a generic one that can be applied to block ciphers, stream ciphers, or even keyed hash functions without necessarily having knowledge of a cipher's internal structure, as long as at least one output bit can be represented by a polynomial of low degree for the secret and public variables. The foundation of the approach proposed by Dinur and Shamir employs basic algebraic cryptanalysis, which involves attempting to lower the degree of polynomial equations that represent a cryptosystem by polynomials of lower degree. They assume that the polynomial equations used to describe a cryptosystem are variants derived from a master polynomial by adding some variables to any possible value. They call this the cube attack "… since it sets some public variables to all their possible values in n, (d-1) dimensional Boolean cubes, and sums the results in each cube," where d represents the degree of the polynomial and n is the number of variables.
The cube attack can be completed in two phases: the preprocessing phase, where the attacker finds as many maxterms (a term or cube of the encryption function such that its cofactor is a linear nonconstant polynomial) as possible, and the actual attacking or online phase, in which the attacker solves the system of linear equations.
APPLICATION
During our investigation, we adopted Armknecht and Krause's approach to model the E0 encryption function, which does not depend on memory bits and will hold for every clock tick. We devised a polynomial of degree four consisting of 20 variables, 16 considered unknown and four known (N. Petrakos, "Cube-Type Algebraic Attacks on Wireless Encryption Protocols," master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Sept. 2009).
We then created an automated tool in the Maple 12 environment (www. maplesoft.com) that finds all the maxterms and their corresponding linear-coefficient superpolys for the E0 encryption function. The most timeconsuming work in the computation process, finding the maxterms and their corresponding superpolys, was executed in the Maple 12 environment because we sought to benefit from the advantages of a high-performance mathematical engine with a fully integrated algebraic processing system.
In the online phase, we used a chosen plaintext attack to solve the system of 12 linear equations by the 8 unknowns we found. In part, the cube attack is a chosen plaintext attack: the part that can be manipulated by the attacker. To implement the cube attack, we assume the attacker has the capability to properly send structured packets that the Bluetooth receiver will respond to, thus providing the attacker with access to the encryption machine.
This machine behaves like an oracle. If the attacker convinces the oracle it is a legitimate participant, it will be duped into sending data to the attacker or another participant; however, the attacker can observe "over the air" whatever responses the oracle or the user sends back.
For example, the attacker can masquerade as a real user, with sufficient detail to send data to the oracle. The oracle will return encrypted data to the attacker or an authorized user/ participant in the communication process, and the attacker will collect this data. The attacker thus gains some knowledge of the output bitstreams for the combiner at clock ticks t, t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. More formally, we have proven that, assuming an attacker has unauthorized access to the encryption protocol, by knowing the output bitstream at any clock time, the cube attack as we have modeled it can succeed in recovering the outputs of the LFSRs for the E0 keystream generator at any stage.
RESULTS
Using the Maple program, we found 12 superpolys, including the unknown variables of the four LFSRs for two consecutive clock times. The program executed several times, for testing purposes, on an Intel Pentium 4 processor with a 2.80-GHz CPU and 1 Gbyte of RAM, producing the results IEEE Software seeks practical, readable articles that will appeal to experts and nonexperts alike.
The magazine aims to deliver reliable information to software developers and managers to help them stay on top of rapid technology change. From the specific encryption function of the multivariable polynomial (obtained after the attacker masquerades as an authorized user and gains access to the security protocol) the attacker will eventually succeed in gathering 12 unique and independent equations, solve them using a chosen plaintext attack, and recover the output bits from the LFSRs.
Next, we measured the complexity of these steps. During the preprocessing phase, an attacker tries to find as many maxterms as possible. From this phase, an attacker might obtain n + 1 output bits from the LFSRs and some constant terms. . Therefore, the overall complexity from both phases is as follows:
In the case of Bluetooth, with n = 128 and d = 4, we determine that the attack on E0 requires 2246656 ≈ 2 21.1 bit operations. The number of operations needed in the computationa l process is considerably less than that of similar algebraic attack types (http:// c a t.i n i s t.f r/ ?a Modele=a f f icheN& cpsidt=15690405), but is limited to the LFSRs' output at any clock tick. Further insight should reveal the encryption key having the output of every LFSR at any time. This raises the question: Given the LFSRs' output, how do we find the key? B uilding on these results, the next stage of our research will validate our integration of the cube attack into the Bluetooth encryption protocol. As demonstrated in this and other research, we need only to understand and formally evaluate the strengths of a given cryptosystem and evaluate its implementation to ensure no flaws have crept into the cryptosystem application. The system and the accompanying protocol it uses might be good, but if poorly implemented it will most likely be untrustworthy.
